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Transformative Decisions
Kevin Reuter and Michael Messerli *
Some of the most fundamental decisions we make in our lives – such as beco-
ming a parent or moving to a different part of the world – are transformative.
According to Laurie Paul (2014), transformative decisions pose a major pro-
blem to us because they fall outside the realm of rationality. Her argument in
favor of that conclusion rests on the premise that the subjective value (i.e.,
the value of experiencing a certain outcome of a decision) plays the central ro-
le in transformative decisions. This paper challenges that premise and hence
the overall conclusion that transformative decisions usually are not rational.
In the theoretical part, we specify the conditions under which transformative
decisions are possibly rational and likely to be rational. The data we present
in the empirical part reveal that subjective value often plays only a minor role
in people’s decision-making process. Putting both parts together, we argue
that people have a great chance of making rational transformative choices.
1 Introduction
Imagine that while you are on holiday, you are confronted with a choice
between two Indian dishes that contain spices you have never tasted before.
Suppose you are considering whether to have a child or remain childless.
Alternatively, envision a slightly less mundane scenario: aliens have taken
over Earth, and you have to make a choice between being transported to
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comments on this paper. Michael Messerli was supported by a Swiss National Science
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an unknown planet where you can start a new life or remaining here under
unknown alien rule.
In Transformative Experience, Paul argues that we usually cannot make a
rational choice in such decision-making situations.1 The first part of her argu-
ment rests on two premises. Premise (i) concerns the nature of the experiences
that characterize those decisions – hereafter termed transformative decisions.
Such decisions involve experiences that are either epistemically transforma-
tive (spices case) or both epistemically and personally transformative (child
case, alien case). Having an epistemically transformative experience of x is
the only way to know what it is like to x. For example, having the experience
of being a father or eating dragon fruit is the only way to know what it is like
to be a father or to eat dragon fruit. An experience that is also personally
transformative changes one’s fundamental preferences. Experiencing life on
an alien planet, for instance, would certainly change one’s core preferences.2
Importantly, when a decision is epistemically transformative, the agent fa-
ces an epistemic wall that he or she cannot penetrate through imagination,
testimony, or scientific investigation.3
Premise (ii) of Paul’s argument is that the subjective value – the value
of experiencing a certain outcome of a decision – plays the central role in
transformative decisions. With respect to decisions such as whether or not
to have a child, Paul claims, “The value of what it is like for the agent
plays the central role, if not the only role, in the decision to procreate.“4
1 Laurie Paul, Transformative Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
2 Paul does not discuss purely personally transformative experiences at any length.
3 Paul reminds us that “current science doesn’t pronounce on how you’ll respond, and
experiences vary widely, so you can’t rely on testimony.“ (Paul, Transformative Expe-
rience, op. cit., p. 36) Her main point is that scientific data on large groups do not
give fine-grained information about how you respond to a particular experience (Paul,
Transformative Experience, op. cit., pp. 131-132). See Herman Cappelen and Josh De-
ver, “Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a
reply to L.A. Paul),“ Inquiry, LX, 3 (December 2016): 315-336 for a critical discussion
about how empathy is related to the ideology of the first person.
4 Laurie Paul, “What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting,“ Res Philosophica, XCII,
2 (April 2015): 1-23, at p. 5.
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Although this aspect of the subjective value is often neglected in discussions
on transformative choices, it is a crucial ingredient of Paul’s argument that
the author emphasizes frequently.5 Consider Paul’s example in which the
subjective value fails to play the central role. Many adults decide to have
a child because they “need an heir, or more hands to work the farm, or
whatever“.6 Although this is not perhaps the most common outlook among
adults in our times, the general point should be clear. Paul’s challenge to the
rationality of a transformative decision does not even begin to arise if people
make decisions independently of the transformative experiences connected
with those decisions. Thus, the challenge only applies if the subjective value
plays the central role. What this means will be clarified in section 2.
Given the first two premises of the argument, we can now substantiate
Paul’s claim that transformative choices cannot be rational by considering
the argument in full:7
5 For example, she writes, “An essential part of your deliberation concerns what your
future life will be like“ (Paul, Transformative Experience, op. cit., p. 3). For further
discussion of this point, see also Paul, Transformative Experience, op. cit., pp. 4, 25, 26,
74, 75, 85, 126.
6 Paul, Transformative Experience, op. cit., p. 85.
7 See Jane Friedman, “Epistemically Transformative Experience,“ (unpublished manus-
cript) for an alternative formulation of the decision problem that focuses on the role of
authenticity within transformative choices. See also John Campbell, “L.A. Paul’s Trans-
formative Experience,“ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XCI, 3 (November
2015): 787-793. It seems possible, however, to formulate the challenge of rational choice
without referring to the concept of authenticity.
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i. One cannot know the subjective value of at least one outcome of a
transformative decision dt.
8
ii. The subjective value plays the central role in transformative decisions
dt.
iii. If (i) & (ii), then the ranking of options in a transformative decision
dt cannot be determined.
iv. If the ranking of options in a decision cannot be determined, then such
a decision cannot be rational.
∴ Transformative decisions dt cannot be rational.
One of Paul’s most significant insights in her book is revealed by pre-
mise (iii) of the argument. If premises (i) and (ii) are both true, then it is
impossible to determine an ordinal ranking of the possible options in such
a decision.9 If the subjective value of having a child cannot be identified,
and if this value plays a central role in the decision process, then there is
no way to assign a specific or probable overall value to the decision to have
a child. It follows that if no overall value can be assigned to that option,
then it becomes impossible to rank the options having a child and not ha-
ving a child. The final premise (iv) states a basic tenet of standard rational
decision theory. A decision can be rational only if the options in a decision
8 A transformative decision dt is a decision that is not merely based on a non-experiential
criterion. We use this specification to exclude from the discussion those cases in which
the subjective value is fully disregarded in the decision-making process.
9 Whereas Paul does not herself speak of ordinal ranking, we believe premise (iii) preserves
the core idea of her claim. Dougherty et al. present a similar reconstruction of that
premise: “If an agent cannot rationally judge the subjective value of a phenomenal
outcome for her, then she cannot rationally choose between options when one of these
options would lead to this phenomenal outcome.“ See Tom Dougherty, Sophie Horowitz
and Paulina Sliwa, “Expecting the Unexpected,“ Res Philosophica, XCII, 2 (April 2015):
301-321, at p. 305.
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process can be ranked.10 The conclusion is as important as it is devastating.
According to Paul’s argument, some of the most fundamental decisions in
our life remain outside the realm of rationality. All hope is not lost, however;
Paul suggests that instead of basing one’s choices on the subjective value,
we should make transformative decisions by asking ourselves how much we
value new experiences or new selves.11
In this paper, we challenge the soundness of Paul’s argument by focusing
primarily on premises (ii) and (iii), and we present empirical results that
suggest that premise (ii) is false for many transformative decisions. At the
same time, we accept Paul’s arguments in favor of premises (i) and (iv).
For premise (i), Paul draws an analogy with Jackson’s famous Mary thought
experiment: Not having seen colors so far in her life, Mary cannot know what
it will feel like to perceive colors until she leaves her room. Analogously, one
who has not become a parent so far in one’s life cannot know what it will feel
like to become a parent. As noted above, premise (iv) is part of the standard
normative decision theory, according to which agents should determine the
values of each possible outcome and make a choice based on the outcome with
the highest expected value. Others, however, have applied different concepts
of rationality. First, according to Pettigrew, Paul does not challenge the
preference-first conception, which merely requires an agent to adhere to the
basic axioms of decision theory, namely completeness and lack of transitivity
violations.12 Second, many theorists endorse a satisfying theory of rationality.
10For a discussion of ordinal preferences, see, for example, chapter 2 in Leonard Savage,
The Foundations of Statistics (New York: John Wiley Sons Inc., 1954). Note that a
decision that cannot be rational is not thereby irrational but rather falls outside the
realm of rationality.
11Paul, Transformative Experience, op. cit., p. 123. See Eli Shupe, “Transformative Experi-
ence and the Limits of Revelation,“ Philosophical Studies,11 (November 2016): 3119-3132
for a critical discussion of Paul’s positive thesis. According to our empirical results, only
in the vampire case do people primarily base their decisions on the revelatory value. Of
course, the results do not tell us whether people should rely on the revelatory value (see
sections 3 and 4).
12Richard Pettigrew, “Transformative Experience and Decision Theory,“Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, XCI, 3 (November 2015): 766-774, at. p. 767. Does Petti-
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Simply put, the idea behind this concept is that it is rational to choose an
option in case it is sufficiently satisfactory.13 Of course, one might argue that
in a transformative choice, an agent cannot follow the satisfying theory of
rationality either because he or she cannot know whether any of the options
is good enough.
Having reconstructed Paul’s argument and premises, we will proceed as
follows in the rest of the paper: In Section 2, we will analyze how the centrality
of a decision criterion relates to the possibility of ranking options in making
transformative decisions. More specifically, we will discuss what it means for
the subjective value to be central such that the agent will make a choice
that is necessarily not rational. Even if the subjective value of, for instance,
becoming a parent, is not the central criterion, many transformative decisions
nonetheless will fail to be rational. We therefore developed a statistical model
that can tell us more precisely how likely it is that a decision is rational given
the importance of the subjective value. Crucially, the likelihood increases
with a decrease in the importance of the subjective value. Thus, to properly
determine how likely it is that a person will make a rational transformative
decision, we need to find out how people judge the importance of various
decision criteria in transformative decisions, and that is exactly the task we
will take up in Section 3. Through a series of studies, we found not only that
premise (ii) of the argument seems mistaken but also that the data suggest
grew’s challenge hold? One might at least question whether transformative decisions are
complete. An agent might prefer neither to become a vampire nor to stay human without
being indifferent to the alternatives. In this respect, there might exist a very interesting
overlap with so-called hard cases of comparison. See, e.g., Ruth Chang, “Hard Choices,“
APA Journal of Philosophy, XCII, 3 (Spring 2017): 586-620); Michael Messerli and Ke-
vin Reuter, “Hard Cases of Comparison“, Philosophical Studies, 9 (September 2017):
2227-2250.
13This concept goes back to Herbert Simon, A behavioral model of rational choice (San-
ta Monica: Rand, 1953). See also Michael Weber, “A New Defense of Satisficing,“ in
Michael Byron, ed., Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 77-106. In Simon’s view, a notion
of rationality in which an agent needs to maximize utility is too demanding. That notion
presupposes computational capacities that we do not possess.
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that what it is like to experience a certain outcome is only one among many
other decision criteria that play a role in transformative decisions. Section 4
will present a general discussion whereby we deal with possible objections to
our methodology and our results.
Before we proceed, we would like to address in advance one worry that
readers familiar with Paul’s writings might have. The experiments we ha-
ve conducted reveal which decision criteria various people in fact take into
account when facing transformative decisions. However, Paul’s approach is
at least in part normative in that she is concerned with normative decision
theory and not with descriptive decision theory. Are we therefore mistaken
in challenging Paul’s claim empirically? We are not; the normative aspects
of Paul’s argument concern the relation between the values of the relevant
outcomes and the rationality of the decision (premise (iv)) but not which
criteria are considered important for determining the value of the outcomes.
Thus, we wholly agree with Paul when she states that “the normative stan-
dard for rational decision making is that the agent or decision maker should
choose the act that has the highest expected value“ (emphasis ours).14
Indeed, in Section 2 we fundamentally rely on this normative standard
to develop a model for determining the relation between the centrality of a
decision criterion and whether or not the decision is rational. However, Paul
makes a descriptive claim about the criteria that determine which outcome
has the highest value: “While the subjective values are not the only values of
these outcomes, they are some of the most central and important ones, and
an emphasis on them fits the dominant cultural paradigm.“15 Thus, Paul’s
argument and the putatively dominant cultural paradigm are not about how
we should determine the value of certain outcomes; rather, Paul is claiming
that subjective values are most central and important. There can be little
doubt, therefore, that Paul bases her normative claims on a purely descriptive
14Paul, Transformative Experience, op. cit., p. 21.
15Ibid., p. 26.
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analysis of the importance of subjective values.
2 Transformative Decisions and
Rational Choice
In Section 1, we started our discussion of Paul’s surprising and insightful con-
clusion that transformative decisions dt are not rational by reconstructing the
underlying argument in favor of that conclusion. We also highlighted that a
crucial premise in her argument is the claim that the subjective values of
the possible outcomes in a transformative choice are central to the decision.
This claim immediately raises two questions: First, what does it mean to
be central? Second, is it really the case that the subjective value plays the
central role in transformative decisions? Paul does not address the first ques-
tion in much detail but primarily relies on our intuitive grasp of centrality.
In contrast, in regard to the second question, Paul contends that in a trans-
formative choice such as deciding whether or not to become a parent, most
people, at least in Western cultures, take the subjective value to be of ut-
most importance. In Section 3, we present results that strongly suggest that
Paul is mistaken in her assessment of what most people consider important
in transformative decisions.
In this part of the paper, we will first specify how we need to interpret
centrality to validate Paul’s argument as valid (Section 2.1) and then provide
a model that tells us how likely it is that a person can make a rational
transformative choice given the importance she places on the subjective value
(Section 2.2).
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2.1 When a transformative decision is
possibly rational
To better understand our investigation into the topic, consider a university
hiring committee that needs to decide which candidate to hire for an open
academic position. Let us look at two extremes: On the one hand, it might
be the case that candidates’ publication records are the only criteria taken
into account. Subsequently, other factors, such as teaching skills, age, and
interests, are of no concern. On the other hand, the committee might dis-
regard the quantity and quality of the publication records and decide, for
instance, to select the person who lives closest to the university. Obviously,
in the former case, a candidate’s publication record is all that counts and is a
fortiori central to the decision-making process. In the latter case, the publi-
cation record plays no role whatsoever. The reality of most hiring committee
decisions hopefully is between these two extremes: Publication records are
important, but other criteria play a role, too. Analogously, on the one hand,
the what-it-is-like aspect of a certain outcome might be the only criterion
in a transformative decision. In that case, the decision cannot be rational
(assuming the truth of the other premises in Paul’s argument). On the other
hand, the what-it-is-like aspect might be of no concern in transformative de-
cisions. Accordingly, the rationality of such transformative decisions is not
threatened. Again, the reality of making a transformative decision is likely to
be somewhere in between these two extremes. For instance, most people ma-
king a choice about whether to become a parent will consider various decision
criteria such as (a) financial situation, (b) what their partners want, and (c)
whether having a child fits into their life vision and perhaps also what it will
feel like to have a child. Thus, the transformative decisions people face are
most likely multi-criteria decisions. Paul acknowledges situations in which
the subjective value plays no role at all when, for instance, discussing the
king who decides to become a parent because he needs an heir to his throne.
However, Paul fails to provide an answer to the question of how important
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the subjective value is when multiple criteria need to be evaluated.
An answer to this question can be given easily by making concrete what
we have so far only considered in abstract terms. Take Mary, who is con-
templating the choice of whether or not to become a parent. At first, Mary
realizes that three criteria of varying importance are relevant to her. The
most important factor to her is (a) whether her partner would like to have a
baby. Less important but still of considerable weight is (b) whether she and
her partner can provide financially for a child. She also (c) imagines what it
will be like for her to have a baby. Although she thinks that the subjective
value should be taken into account when making such a decision, the other
two criteria play a greater role. We can put this in numerical terms by sta-
ting that Mary’s criteria priorities or weights wi are as follows: wpartner = 0.4
(read this as saying that the criterion <partner> accounts for 40% of the
decision process), wcosts = 0.35, and wwhatitslike = 0.25.
16 The values for all
criteria priorities should, of course, add up to 1, which is equivalent to saying
that all decision criteria make up 100% of the decision process.
In the second stage of the decision process, Mary determines the so-called
local alternative priorities or values vi – that is, how much the three criteria
favor a certain outcome.17 Let us first suppose that Mary’s partner very much
would like to have a child. Thus, for criterion <partner>, Mary assigns the
value 1 to the outcome “having a child“ – that is, vpartner/pro child = 1, and 0 to
“not having a child“ (vpartner/contra child = 0). Second, Mary and her partner
have a stable financial situation, although it is not ideal. Thus, for criterion
16There are at least four common assumptions made in most models of such decision pro-
cesses: (1) separability of the decision criteria (to avoid double-counting), (2) numerical
ascertainability of the criteria weights, (3) the weight and value attributions range bet-
ween 0 and 1, and (4) for each i, voutcome1 + voutcome2 = 1. The empirical studies in the
next section will demonstrate how we arrived at the numerical weights of each decision
criterion. We will address objections to the separability of the decision criteria in the
general discussion.
17This is the usual terminology used in multi-criteria decision analysis (see, e.g., Alessio
Ishizaka and Philippe Nemery, Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis: Methods and Software
(Singapore: Wiley, 2013), p. 16).
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<costs>, Mary assigns the values vcosts/pro child = 0.5 and vcosts/contra child
= 0.5. The subjective values vwhatitslike/pro child and vwhatitslike/contra child are
unknown. By adding up the products of the weights and values, we can
determine the overall utilities Uoutcome =
n∑
i=1
ui =
n∑
i=1
vi ∗wi for each of the two
outcomes given the first two decision criteria:
Upro child = 1 ∗ wpartner + 0.5 ∗ wcosts = 1 ∗ 0.4 + 0.5 ∗ 0.35 = 0.575.
Ucontra child = 0 ∗ wpartner + 0.5 ∗ wcosts = 0 ∗ 0.4 + 0.5 ∗ 0.35 = 0.175.
Now, even if the subjective value were to speak strongly against having
a baby (e.g., vwhatitslike/contra child = 1 because Mary would feel completely
drained by the additional responsibility and the lack of sleep), the overall
utility of not having a child would be at most Ucontra child = 0.425 (0.175 +
0.25) and thus still much lower than Upro child = 0.575. Thus, the what-it-
is-like aspect of having a child has no bearing on the outcome of Mary’s
decision about whether or not to have a child. In other words, the subjective
value is not important enough to influence the decision process, and the
transformative choice is rational. To guarantee that premise (iii) of Paul’s
argument is true, and hence that the transformative decision is not rational,
the weight of the subjective value wwhatitslike needs to be at least 0.5. In other
words, it should account for at least 50% of the decision process. If the weight
is equal to or greater than 0.5, then even if all the other criteria speak for one
outcome, the overall utility can shift in favor of the opposite outcome. If the
weight is lower, however, then it is possible that the transformative decision
is rational. We can therefore state more precisely what is meant by central in
premise (ii) of Paul’s argument: The subjective value plays the central role in
a decision process if and only if it is at least as important as all other criteria
taken together.18
18We do not claim that the way we have cashed out the notion of centrality matches
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How threatening are these considerations for the validity of Paul’s argu-
ment? There seem to be two possible ways to respond to the challenge we
pose. First, one might maintain that the weight of wwhatitslike is generally
greater than 0.5. The empirical data in Section 3 show that such a response
would be mistaken. Second, we might note that the value of 0.5 is only a
cut-off point above which it is not possible to rank the outcomes ordinally.
In almost all situations, however, a lower weight will still be sufficiently high,
such that no rational decision will be made.
In the example above, wwhatitslike = 0.25 was not sufficiently high, but if
the weight had been just a little higher, then no rational decision could have
been made. To assess the strength of the second response, we now need to
determine the dependency of the rationality of a transformative choice on
the weights of the subjective value wwhatitslike.
2.2 When a transformative decision is likely rational
Whereas in the previous subsection we focused on the possibility of making
a rational transformative choice, in this section we will examine how likely it
is that people make rational transformative choices. In the example above,
we have seen that the criteria <partner> and <costs> were too important
for the subjective value to play any role.
Let us start by stating in more general terms when a transformative
decision is rational. Assuming a binary choice, if one outcome is considered
so much better than the other outcome, such that the subjective value does
not make any difference, then the transformative decision is rational. It then
simply does not matter whether the value vwhatitslike can be determined. More
precisely, we can state condition (R):
(R) | Uoutcome 1 - Uoutcome 2 | ≥ wwhatitslike,
Paul’s concept of centrality. As mentioned above, Paul remains more or less silent on
this matter.
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where Uoutcome =
n∑
i=1
vi∗wi. (R) states that the absolute difference between
the overall utility of one outcome and the overall utility of the other outcome –
without taking into account the subjective value – is greater than wwhatitslike.
If (R) holds true, then the transformative decision is rational.
Thus, the two types of variables that are required to determine whether
or not a transformative decision is rational are the weights of the criteria wi
as well as the values vi. It seems we can now simply ask people to tell us the vi
and wi of the various decision criteria and plug them into our formula. If Paul
is correct in thinking that transformative decisions in general are not rational,
we should find that most people violate condition (R) in that wwhatitslike
is sufficiently high to have a decisive influence on transformative decisions.
In the next section, we present the results of several studies in which we
asked hundreds of participants to report the weights wi when confronted with
various imaginary transformative decisions. However, we did not determine
the values vi of the various decision criteria because this would have required
that we only consider people currently facing a transformative decision.19 The
online surveys we conducted allowed us to collect the wi relatively easily from
a random sample of people from the Amazon Mechanical Turk pool. Although
it would have been fascinating to interview people who are currently facing
transformative decisions, this was not feasible for the purposes of this study.20
Are we therefore left without a means to connect the importance of the
subjective value with the rationality of a transformative decision? Fortuna-
tely, statistical models can be used to predict how likely it is that a transfor-
mative decision is rational given the weight wwhatitslike. In our first statistical
model, we simplified the complexity of the situation by assigning values vi to
19To see why, let us return to the choice of whether or not to have a child. Some decision
criteria, such as <partner>, are indeterminate for most participants unless they have a
partner and are currently in the process of making such a decision.
20This restriction on our studies might fuel concern that the participants’ ratings are not
representative of decisions made in real-life contexts. We will respond to this worry in
sections 3 and 4.
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each criterion based on the assumption that the values vi can be only 1 and
0. Thus, we assumed that a decision criterion either speaks fully in favor (1)
of an option (e.g., having a child) or speaks wholly against (0) that option
(e.g. against having a child). Besides imagining what it is like to be a parent,
Mary considers two decision criteria, <partner> and <costs>, to be relevant.
Thus, there are 22 = 4 possibilities for how the values can be combined: (1,1),
(1,0), (0,1), (0,0). Using (R) above, we can therefore calculate how likely it
is that Mary will make a rational decision.
1. |1 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.35− (0 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.35)| = 0.75 > 0.25 (rational)
2. |1 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.35− (0 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.35)| = 0.05 < 0.25 (not rational)
3. |0 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.35− (1 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.35)| = 0.05 < 0.25 (not rational)
4. |0 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.35− (1 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.35)| = 0.75 > 0.25 (rational)
Thus, in two out of four (i.e., 50%) of the combinations, Mary will make
a rational decision. In many transformative choices, of course, there will be
many more decision criteria that might be relevant to people’s choices. In
all the empirical studies we conducted (see the next section), we presented
people with a total of six criteria, including the subjective value. For the other
five criteria, there are 25 = 32 different possibilities that must be calculated
to determine the overall number of rational decisions given the weights of all
decision criteria, such as (1,1,1,1,1), (1,0,1,0,1).
We can now outline some specific cases related to the dependency of the
rationality of a transformative decision on the subjective value of wwhatitslike.
Aside from using five decision criteria (excluding <what it is like>) and
normalizing the values to 1, we first consider the case in which all weights
(excluding the weight of the subjective value) are equal: w1 = w2= w3 = w4 =
w5 = (1−wwhatitslike)/5. Starting with these assumptions, we can determine
the number of rational transformative choices using the following formula:
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Number of Rational Decisions = 2 ∗ ⊖(1 − 2 ∗ wwhatitslike) +
10 ∗ ⊖(3− 8 ∗ wwhatitslike) + 20 ∗ ⊖(1− 6 ∗ wwhatitslike)
21
The plot of the function for this very general case is depicted in Figure 1
(upper left-hand side). Importantly, the graph shows that the less important
the subjective value is (the smaller wwhatitslike), the greater the number of
rational decisions and hence the more likely that the person indeed will make
a rational transformative decision. Given the assumptions we used, which
simplified both weights wi and values vi, four different steps need to be
distinguished. If wwhatitslike falls below 0.5, there are two combinations for
which the transformative decision is rational, namely the ones in which all
other criteria speak in favor of the same outcome. However, if wwhatitslike is
less than 0.375, there are 12 combinations for which the decision turns out to
be rational. A value of 0.16 or less ensures that the transformative decision
is necessarily rational (all 32 possible combinations are rational decisions).
These results might be interpreted as supporting Paul’s view at least to some
extent. After all, even if the subjective value does not play the central role,
it might be important enough that only very few combinations turn out to
be rational. We will see that this optimism is premature.
For the admittedly simple model sketched above, we find that the lower
the wwhatitslike, the greater the number of rational decisions. Does this relati-
on hold when we adopt a more realistic model? It does. To simulate a more
complex situation, we dropped the assumption that all weights of nonexpe-
21⊖(x) is the Heaviside step function, which takes the value 0 if x < 0 and 1 otherwise. We
give a brief explanation of how the first term of the formula can be derived. The other
terms can be calculated in a similar fashion. In the case in which all non-experiential
criteria speak in favor of one outcome, then the decision is rational if |w1 + w2 + w3 +
w4 + w5| ≥ wwhatitslike. We can now substitute wi = (1− wwhatitslike)/5 and simplify
the equation, which yields 1− 2 ∗ wwhatitslike > 0. Thus, the condition is satisfied only
if wwhatitslike is less than 0.5. There are two possibilities that need to be considered:
the case in which all non-experiential criteria speak in favor of one outcome and the
case in which they all speak against a certain outcome. Hence, the first term is 2 *
⊖(1− 2∗wwhatitslike).
riential decision criteria are assigned the same value. Rather, we stipulated
weights of increasing value: w1 < w2 < w3 < w4 < w5
22. The upper right-
hand side of Figure 1 shows how the number of rational decisions depends
on the importance of wwhatitslike. Again, a decrease in the importance of the
subjective value leads to an increase in the likelihood of making a rational
transformative choice. As the lower part of Figure 1 shows, the general incre-
ase in rational decisions with decreasing wwhatitslike depends neither on the
normalization of the values (lower left-hand side; v1 = 0.3, v2 = 0.7, v3 = 0.3,
v4 = 0.7, v5 = 0.3) nor on having used five additional criteria (four criteria,
lower right-hand side).
Figure 1: Plots of functions depicting the relation between the weight wwhatitslike (x-axis) and the
number of rational decisions (y-axis). In the upper left, weights wi for all criteria except wwhatitslike are
equal. Values vi are normalized. In the upper right, weights wi for all criteria are different. Values vi are
normalized. In the bottom left, weights wi for all criteria are different. Values vi are not normalized. In
the bottom right, weights wi for all criteria are different. Only four additional criteria are used.
We varied several parameters that play a role in determining the depen-
22More precisely, we assigned the following priorities to each criteria: v1 = 1 * (1-
wwhatitslike) / 15 < v2 = 2 * (1 - wwhatitslike) / 15 < v3 = 3 * (1 - wwhatitslike) /
15 < v4 = 4 * (1 - wwhatitslike) / 15 < v5 = 5 * (1 - wwhatitslike) / 15.
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dency of the number of rational transformative decisions on the subjective
value. The results paint a clear picture: The smaller the weight of the sub-
jective value, the greater the likelihood that a person will make a rational
transformative decision. Thus, those people who do not consider the subjec-
tive value to be very important in their decision process have a high chance
of making rational transformative decisions. Perhaps Paul is right, however,
in arguing that a central tenet of our culture’s ordinary way of thinking
about transformative decisions is to place sufficiently high emphasis on the
subjective value. We will now see that this view is mistaken.
3 Empirical Studies
Paul claims that transformative decisions dt are not rational. For Paul’s ar-
gument to be acceptable, the subjective value of a transformative experience
needs to be the central decision criterion. In the previous section, we deve-
loped a model that allows us to calculate the likelihood that an individual
will make a rational transformative choice provided we do have the weights
of all the decision criteria for that individual. In this part of the paper, we
present the results of an empirical investigation into transformative decisions.
We examine (i) whether the subjective value of a transformative decision is
central and (ii) how likely it is that subjects make rational transformative
choices.
3.1 Methods
Paul and most commentators on her work tend to focus on those transfor-
mative decisions that are transformative not only epistemically (e.g., spices
case) but also personally (i.e., decisions that will change the core preferences
of the person making the decision). The two examples that have received the
greatest attention in Paul’s work are the decisions about whether to become
a parent and whether to become a vampire. We also added our own case,
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in which a subject must decide either to leave earth or to continue living
on earth under alien rule. In what follows we present the results of three
empirical studies involving those personally transformative choices.
To determine the most plausible criteria for all three cases, we ran a
pretest in which we randomly assigned 81 participants to either the parent
case, the vampire case, or the alien case. Subjects were asked to identify
three criteria they would consider most important when making such decisi-
ons. The most common answers were then collected and categorized. In the
parent case, the following five criteria were mentioned most frequently: (a)
discussions with partner, (b) financial costs, (c) collecting information from
books and other sources, (d) subjective value, and (e) consistency with other
goals in life. Some participants also mentioned that they would contemplate
how the decision would change their life. Interestingly, Paul’s positive ac-
count relates closely to these responses. According to her positive view, in
making transformative decisions we should base our choices on whether we
might be happy to become persons with fundamentally different preferences
and undergo changes to our personalities. Given participants’ responses and
our interest in empirically investigating Paul’s suggestion, we included open-
ness to change as a sixth decision criterion. We also would like to mention
that Kauppinen has suggested that people should base their transformative
choices on how consistent those choices are with previous goals.23 Whereas
Kauppinen presents a normative claim about how people should make deci-
sions, the descriptive version of his claim closely matches criterion (e). Paul
has argued repeatedly that the subjective value of an outcome of a decision
needs to be understood widely as the “value of lived experience.“24 In the ge-
neral discussion, we will explore the objection that some of the criteria that
we listed as independent of the subjective value actually fall within Paul’s
23See Antti Kauppinen, “What’s So Great About Experience?,“ Res Philosophica, XCII,
2 (April 2015): 371-388.
24See Laurie Paul, “Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies,“ Res Philosophica,
XCII, 2 (April 2015): 473-545, at p. 513.
18
conception of the value of lived experience.
For the main study, a total of 181 participants were recruited on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. Of these, 81 participants were assigned to the parent case,
39 (14 female, Mage = 36.87, STD = 11.43) to the vampire case, and 41 (16
female, Mage = 36.61, STD = 12.20) to the alien rule case. In the parent
case, 28 participants had to be excluded because they were already parents.
However, we did analyze their ratings to investigate the robustness of the
importance of the decision criteria. Of the remaining 53 participants, 23 were
female, and the mean age was Mage = 31.87 (STD = 9.75). The vignette in
the parent case read as follows:25
Parent Case Imagine considering becoming a parent and having to decide whether
or not to have a child. How would you arrive at a decision?
The participants were then asked to rate the importance of six randomly
ordered decision criteria on a scale from 0 meaning “not at all important“ to
10 meaning “extremely important“. The decision criteria were as follows:
• I discuss it with my partner.
• I imagine what it will feel like to have the experiences and emotions when being a
parent.
• I consider external factors like financial costs.
• I consider whether becoming a parent is consistent with the goals I have for my life,
like my career plans and my vision of family life.
• I consider whether I will be happy to possibly become a person with fundamentally
different preferences and undergo changes to my personality.
25The vignette in the vampire case, for instance, was formulated following Paul’s capti-
vating introduction (Paul, Transformative Experience, op. cit., p. 1). The vignette in the
alien rule scenario was as follows: Imagine that aliens have taken over the world, and you
have to choose between being transported to an unknown planet where you can start a
new life or staying on Earth under unknown alien rule. Now suppose you have to make
the decision immediately. How would you arrive at a decision?
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• I read about the pros and cons of having a baby.
The subjective value was operationalized using the criterion “I imagine
what it will feel like to have the experiences and emotions when being a
parent.“
3.2 Results
To evaluate the differences between the various decision criteria in relation to
the rating for the subjective value, we applied a repeated measures ANOVA
with Rating as the dependent variable and Criteria as the independent factor
with six levels (asking partner, subjective value, cost, consistency, openness,
reading). The means and p-values for the criteria in the parent case are listed
in Table 1.
Table 1: The importance of all six decision criteria in the parent case averaged over all participants.
For the parent case, the pairwise comparisons show that the ratings for
the subjective value (7.68) were fourth after asking partner (8.66), cost (8.26),
and consistency (7.85). Differences between these four criteria were not si-
gnificant. The vampire scenario yielded a slightly different picture. Here, the
subjective value was rated second (6.79) after openness to change (7.18). In
the alien rule case, the subjective value (7.15) was the most important decisi-
on criterion but was not significantly different compared to all other decision
criteria. Thus, in all three studies, the subjective value was only one of many
decision criteria participants considered important.
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Given the absolute ratings of each participant, we calculated the relative
weights of all six criteria for each individual.26 We then determined the ave-
rage weights of all the criteria across all participants. When comparing the
importance of these criteria, we found that the subjective value determines
the outcome of the decision process only by 17%. Other criteria such as fi-
nancial costs (19%) and partner’s desires (20%) seem to be on average more
important to people. The results are shown in Figure 2 and demonstrate that
the relative weight of the subjective value is much smaller than the cut-off
value of 0.5 that we determined to be the crucial value for Paul’s argument
to be sound.
Figure 2: Relative weights of all decision criteria averaged over all 52 participants in the parent case.
The subjective value only received 17% of the overall weight in the decision whether or not to become a
parent and is hence not more important than other criteria.
3.3 Likelihood of rational decision
Although we have established that the subjective value is not central and
hence the decision process is possibly rational, we argued in section 2 that
the weights themselves do not give us a final verdict on whether an agent will
make a rational decision. To make that determination, we need the respective
values of the decision criteria. In other words, we need to know whether a
certain criterion speaks in favor or against a certain outcome. We do not
know these values, primarily because they are very difficult to come by, so
we developed a statistical model in section 2 that enables us to calculate the
26The relative weights of the decision criteria were calculated as follows: We divided each
individual rating by the sum of the ratings of all six decision criteria. Thus, imagine that
a person gave the following ratings: asking partner (7), subjective value (6), costs (8),
consistency (5), openness (3), and reading (1). The sum of all ratings is 30. The relative
weights of the decision criteria are as follows: asking partner (7 / 30 = 0.23), subjective
value (0.2), costs (0.27), consistency (0.17), openness (0.1), and reading (0.03). Note also
that the results do not change when irrelevant criteria are added because the overall sum
of the ratings is independent of the number of criteria.
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likelihood that a subject will make a rational choice. By using a binary system
and assigning values of either 1 or 0 to the two possible outcomes, we can
specify how likely it is that the person will make a rational choice. To do this,
we took the weights of each participant in our study and calculated (using a
computer script) the ratio of rational and not rational choices (for details see
section 2). As there are five decision criteria aside from the subjective value,
the total possible combinations for each participant were 32.
Applying the statistical model revealed that only 6 out of 53 participants
who completed the survey had less than a 50% chance of making a rational
choice. The distribution of the number of rational decisions for each partici-
pant in the study is depicted in Figure 3. On average, the subjective value
influenced people’s decisions in only 35% of cases. Thus, people have appro-
ximately a 65% chance to make a rational choice. (For comparison, whereas
discussions with a partner determine almost 50% of all decisions, reading
literature was determinant in only 24% of the possible combinations). In the
alien rule case, in which the subjective value received the highest rating, the
results do not offer much stronger support for Paul’s thesis because 59% of
the possible decisions turned out to be rational decisions. It is therefore safe
to say that given the empirical results we obtained and the statistical model
we applied, it is likely that people make rational transformative decisions. We
come to this conclusion not because we excluded the subjective value from
the decision-making process as would the king who needs an heir; rather, we
considered the subjective value, but its role can often be neglected because
of its relatively low significance.
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Figure 3: Histogram showing how many of a total of 32 decisions turn out to be rational for each
participant using the statistical model described in the main text. For example, one participant rated the
importance of the criteria such that only 7 out of 32 decisions would be rational, but for four
participants, all combinations yielded rational decisions.
3.4 Discussion
The decision to become a parent is one of the most crucial decisions a person
can make in his or her life. When we make this decision, we take various deci-
sion criteria under consideration, among them the subjective value of what it
is like to be a parent. Other transformative decisions, such as whether or not
to become a vampire, also feature largely in discussions surrounding Paul’s
claim about the rationality of transformative decisions. The results of our
empirical studies demonstrate that the subjective value fails to play the cen-
tral role in these decision processes for most people. Instead, as the average
values suggest, the subjective value is only one among many criteria that play
a role in decision making. Thus, it seems that the claim that transformative
decisions are not rational needs to be revised substantially. In fact, if we ass-
ume our studies are representative, most people, when facing transformative
decisions, have a very good chance of making rational decisions.
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4 General Discussion
Some of the most fundamental decisions we make in our lives are transforma-
tive and – if Paul’s argument is sound – fall outside the realm of rationality.
Thus, the importance of a project investigating transformative decisions both
empirically and analytically can hardly be underestimated. In this paper, we
have accomplished three objectives: First, we highlighted a crucial premise
in Paul’s argument, the investigation of which has so far been neglected. To
be able to conclude that transformative decisions are not rational, the sub-
jective value of a transformative decision needs to be central to the decision
process. Second, we specified the conditions under which transformative de-
cisions are possibly rational and likely to be rational. Our analysis showed
that if the weight of the subjective value is lower than the weights of all other
criteria taken together, the transformative decision is possibly rational. We
then developed four statistical models that suggested that the lower the im-
portance of the subjective value to the agent, the more likely it is that his or
her transformative decision is rational. Third, the empirical investigation of
transformative decisions revealed that the importance of the subjective value
is often much lower than has so far been assumed by Laurie Paul and other
scholars working on this topic. For most people, it is not only possible but
also quite likely that they make rational transformative choices.
It is important to note that we have not determined how many people ac-
tually decide rationally when facing transformative choices. The experiments
were not designed to deliver such an answer. As we argued in section 2, to
make that determination one needs to collect not only the weights wi of the
various decision criteria (which we have done) but also the values vi that
indicate whether the respective criteria speak in favor of or against a certain
outcome (which we have not done). Experiments that collect these values vi
are highly desirable but are also much more costly and time-consuming.27
27One possible exception to the claim that we do not know the direction of the criteria are
the financial costs of having a child, which in our culture would mostly speak against
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Given the statistical models we developed, however, it is still possible to mo-
ve beyond what is actually given in the empirical data. For each and every
participant in our study, the application of such models allowed us to calcu-
late the likelihood that they would make a rational choice. The results pose a
serious challenge to Paul’s depiction of transformative choices. Although she
is right to claim that transformative decisions are possibly not rational, the
empirical reality reveals a picture in which transformative decisions are likely
to be rational for the majority of people. In the remainder of this paper, we
tackle five objections against our approach and results.
First, one might argue that although we tackled the question of the cen-
trality of the subjective value, we neglected the role of possible changes in
a person’s core preferences, which are central to Paul’s discussion. Note, ho-
wever, that the issue of possible changes in a person’s core preferences only
becomes a problem if the decision is at least partially based on the subjecti-
ve value itself. Thus, a person who makes a decision in favor of becoming a
mother and brackets the transformative experience from her considerations
does not make a non-rational choice even if she later regrets her decision
based on her experiences.28 Paul herself has stated that people who decide
to become parents because, for example, they want more hands to work the
farm do not fail to make rational decisions. Nonetheless, one might push this
objection a little further by arguing that changes to one’s preferences not on-
ly affect the values vi we assign for each criterion to different outcomes but
also the weights wi of the various criteria themselves. Furthermore, although
many participants in our studies did not rate the subjective value as suffi-
ciently high to have an impact on their decision, the subjective value was not
completely disregarded. Thus, if a person’s preferences change such that the
having a child. The decision-making problem could therefore perhaps be simplified.
28See Pettigrew, “’Transformative Experience and Decision Theory,“op. cit., pp. 766-774
for an interesting discussion of the problem of weighing preferences, which might change
as a result of making a choice. In this regard, an interesting question about personal iden-
tity might also exist (see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984)), i.e., do transformative experiences undermine psychological continuity?
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weight of the what-it-is-like criterion becomes so important that he or she
would have decided differently, then arguably the decision was not rational.
In the end, we believe this objection is also open to empirical verification.
Although we do not have hard evidence for how the relative importance of
decision criteria in transformative choices might change, the data we collec-
ted from people who already have children indicate that the weights of the
decision criteria (at least for the parent case) are fairly robust (see the next
objection).
A second objection can be mounted against the general approach that
we employed in this paper. How can we be certain that the participants’
responses reflect their real preferences and behaviors? Psychological studies,
for instance, have shown that moral responses in controlled settings do not
always correlate with real moral behavior.29 However, a variety of empirical
studies also have shown high consistency between people’s stated preferences
and their revealed preferences when it comes to aspects such as consumer
choices or family planning.30 Thus, the strength of this objection is likely
to depend on the respective context. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any
empirical evidence in favor of or against using our methodology for the inves-
tigation of transformative choices. We also are not aware of any theoretical
arguments from the literature about why people’s responses might not re-
flect their real preferences in our experimental settings. One might argue, of
course, that there is a large time gap between the revealing of preferences
and the actual decision making. A shorter time gap could disclose greater
importance of the subjective value.
Let us give a two-pronged response. First, we can safely assume that all
29Nicholas Epley and David Dunning, “Feeling “Holier Than Thou“: Are Self-Serving
Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?,“ Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, LXXIX, 6 (December 2000): 861-875.
30Maria Loureiro, Jill McCluskey and Ron Mittelhammer, “Are Stated Preferences Good
Predictors of Market Behavior?,“ Land Economics, LXXIX, 1 (February 2003): 44-55;
Indralal De Silva, “Consistency between Reproductive Preferences and Behavior: The
Sri Lankan Experience,“ Studies in Family Planning, XXII, 3 (May 1991): 188-197.
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the participants have already made many transformative decisions – some
more important, some less. It is therefore quite plausible to expect that tho-
se people can draw upon a wealth of past experiences when judging how
important subjective value is for upcoming decisions. Second, for the parent
case, we not only asked participants who were not yet parents but also those
who were already parents. We asked the latter group to tell us how important
the various criteria were when they made their decision. The results revealed
remarkable consistency between non-parents and parents. The only criterion
for which we recorded a significant difference was <costs>. Whereas singles
tended to rate the importance of financial costs highly, parents did not believe
that those costs were crucial in their decision to become parents.
The third objection targets a crucial underlying presupposition in our
approach. A strong assumption of multi-criteria decision processes is that a
proper evaluation of the various criteria requires that the criteria are inde-
pendent of each other. This independence is important because no criterion
should be double-counted. The experiments we conducted do not directly
explore whether people actually make trade-offs among different criteria.31
To illustrate the problem, imagine that two criteria (e.g., cost and consis-
tency with previous goals) speak against having a child. If people interpret
consistency with goals as having a specific amount of money, then cost is at
least partially double-counted. In other words, the criteria that speak against
an outcome would then be overstated. To address this worry, we conducted
a permutation test with 10.000 permutations in order to investigate whether
the responses to the various criteria were indeed independent of each other.32
Two significant correlations were found: First, the criteria ask partner and
subjective value were shown to be correlated (r = 0.3623, p = .009) as well
as cost and consistency with previous goals (r = 0.2821, p = .039). No other
significant correlations were found. While the outcome of the permutation
31We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pressing this point.
32We are grateful to Moritz Grosse-Wentrup for helping us run the permutation test.
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test demonstrates some dependency of the criterion ask partner on subjective
value, the results cannot be drawn upon to question the general thrust of our
empirical investigation: A correlation coefficient of 0.36 indicates a relatively
weak correlation. Furthermore, no other significant correlations were found
between the subjective value and any of the four other decision criteria.
Fourth, and similarly, one might challenge the idea that the importance
of the what-it-is-like criteria can be determined independently from the other
criteria. One might even go so far as to argue that the what-it-is-like criterion
functions as a placeholder for every other criterion. For example, when you
imagine how it will feel to have a child, you might consider what it will
be like to spend less money during the holidays. Paul has explicitly stated
that the subjective value includes “ways we’d experience ourselves in such
outcomes.“33
Kauppinen and Paul, for instance, have debated how far the criterion
<consistency with goals> is an integral part of the subjective value in a
transformative decision.34 However, it seems that at least in the parent case
the majority of the criteria, such as <asking partner>, <cost>, and <rea-
ding>, have little to no bearing on the subjective value of the outcomes.
Thus, independently of what you imagine it will feel like, you either consider
your partner’s opinion and the ensuing costs of the decision to be important
or you do not. We also can assume that the criterion <openness to change>
is distinct from the subjective value given that Paul suggests we should make
transformative decisions by relying on how much we value new experiences
or new selves instead of relying on the subjective value of the outcomes.
A fifth and final worry can be raised against the design of the experiments.
Admittedly, we did not allow the participants to express the possible attitude
that the subjective value criterion takes lexical priority over the other criteria.
In other words, when we divided each individual rating (on a scale of 1–10)
33Paul, “Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies,“ op. cit., p. 514.
34Kauppinnen, “What’s So Great About Experience?,“ op. cit., pp. 371-388; Paul, “Trans-
formative Choice: Discussion and Replies,“ op. cit., pp. 473-545.
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by the sum of all ratings, we implicitly assumed numerical comparability.
This assumption need not hold, of course. Instead, those people who rated
subjective value the highest might have expressed that the subjective value is
not only more important than any other criteria but is also lexically prior to
them. To counter this objection, we would like to point out that only a single
participant rated subjective value to be the sole, highest-rated criterion.
Empirical investigations of transformative decisions come with several
methodological difficulties. We hope that further experimental studies will
follow to refine the methods and hence deliver more precise results with
regard to when and under which conditions people make or are likely to
make rational transformative decisions. Given the results we presented in this
paper, it seems highly likely that many transformative decisions fall inside
the realm of rationality. We believe we have at least shifted the burden of
proof to those who continue to argue for the opposite claim.
5 Conclusion
The status of transformative experiences plays a crucial role in the argu-
ment against the rationality of transformative decisions. Not only are those
experiences supposed to be impenetrable, but the subjective value needs to
be central in transformative decision processes. In this paper, we have ana-
lyzed the notion of centrality and have demonstrated the requirements for
transformative decisions to be possibly and likely rational. We then provided
an empirical investigation of transformative decisions. Perhaps surprisingly,
the subjective value turned out to be not central in transformative decision
processes; furthermore, the results revealed that most people are more likely
than not to make rational transformative decisions even if they take into
account the subjective value of the transformative choice.
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